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Bloom: Classification of Hezbollah

THE CLASSIFICATION OF
HEZBOLLAH IN BOTH
INTERNATIONAL AND
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICTS-

CATHERINE BLOOM--

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel questions an important,
yet unclear part of international humanitarian law. Specifically, what
would Hezbollah' s legal classification be if another armed conflict were
to arise between Israel and Lebanon? Would Hezbollah be considered a
State or non-State actor? If Hezbollah is a non-State actor, would the
group be considered "guerrillas"? Would the term "mercenary" be a
better fit?
In attempting to answer some of these questions, we must first look at

what exactly occurred between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of
2006. Second, we must understand who Hezbollah is and how the group
fits in with Lebanon. Third, we need to examine what kinds of rules of
international humanitarian law govern both international and
intra-national armed conflicts. Specifically, the Hague Conventions, the
Geneva Conventions, international agreements between Lebanon and
* This article focuses only on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of
2006 and attempts to discuss the implications of intemationallaw with respect to that specific armed
conflict only. Recent events taking place in Lebanon would lend themselves to a different analysis
and, likely, a different outcome
** J.D., 2008, Golden Gate University; B.S., DePaul University, 2001.
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Israel, and international customary law. Only then will we be ready to
investigate the various implications Hezbollah's classification has on the
laws of armed conflict. This will primarily be accomplished by initially
looking at which of the Geneva Conventions apply based on whether
Hezbollah is a State or non-State actor. A more complex argument is
whether Hezbollah is indeed a Lebanese State actor. However, since the
law in this sphere is still being defined, we will continue by examining
Hezbollah's classification assuming they are non-State actor. Therefore,
an analysis of Hezbollah as a guerrilla group and one comprised of
mercenaries will follow. Finally, we will look to see how domestic law
fits in with international humanitarian law, and whether the former can
help adjudicate either party in a future conflict.
The answer to these questions is of great significance because
Hezbollah's classification determines how international humanitarian
law applies. For example, if Hezbollah is a State actor, then any future
conflicts would be between Lebanon and Israel. As such, this would be
an international armed conflict. On the other hand, if Hezbollah is a
non-State actor, then this would be an intra-national armed conflict
governed by a substantially limited body of law. Furthermore, if
Hezbollah is given prisoner of war status, then members of the group
would have to be released at the end of the hostilities. If Hezbollah
members are not considered prisoners of war, then the individuals may
be held and prosecuted under domestic criminal law for their conduct.

II.

BACKGROUND

A. RECENT ISRAEL - LEBANON CONFLICT
On July 12, 2006, members of Hezbollah attacked an Israeli army
convoy, killing eight Israeli soldiers and capturing two more. l Hezbollah
claimed that the soldiers were captured for the purpose of being used as
"bargaining chips" in negotiations for the release of three Lebanese
Hezbollah members detained by Israel (even though the country's own
Supreme Court ordered for their release).2 As a result of the soldiers'
kidnapping, Israel attacked Lebanon with a force unseen since 1982.3 In
response to Israel's "bombing campaign," Hezbollah launched hundreds
1.
Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.htrnl; see also Anthony Dworkin, The Middle East Crisis
and International Law, Crimes of War Project, July 18, 2006,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-middleeast.html.
2.
Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.htrnl
3.
Id.
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of rockets into Israe1. 4 Israel and Hezbollah engaged in a heavy armed
conflict until August 14, 2006. 5 In addition to executing 5,000 air strikes
over Lebanon, Israel's "Operation Change of Direction" involved
attacking various parts of Lebanon from land and sea. 6 Hezbollah ftred
over 2,500 rockets into Israel over the course of the conflict. 7 According
to the Reuters Foundation, as of August 25, 2006, close to 1,200
Lebanese and 157 Israelis were killed in the conflict. s Hundreds of
thousands of Israeli civilians and roughly one million Lebanese civilians
were displaced as a result of the conflict and the destruction of a large
part of southern Lebanon. 9
The armed attack on the convoy on Israeli soil and Israel's retaliatory
bombing campaign on Lebanon is considered an armed conflict. There is
much debate with respect to this conflict, including the question of
whether it should be classifted as an international or non-international
armed conflict. to In either scenario, this conflict is governed by
international humanitarian law.

4.
Id.
5. Amnesty Int'!, IsraeVLebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel,
September 14, 2006, http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006.
6.
Id.; see also Statement submitted by Human Rights Watch to the Second Special session of
the Human Rights Council, The terrible toll of the Israel-Lebanon conflict on civilians: ongoing
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, August 10, 2006,
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/0S/10Ilebano13955_txt.htm.
7.
Statement submitted by Human Rights Watch to the Second Special session of the Human
Rights Council, The terrible toll of the Israel-Lebanon conflict on civilians: ongoing human rights
abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, August 10, 2006,
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/0S/10Ilebano13955_txt.htm.
S.
Reuters Foundation, Who Works Where: Lebanon latest, August 24, 2006,
http://www.alertnet.org/thefactslreliefresourcesI11534S060912.htm; see also Sara Leah Whitson,
He;:bollah Needs to Answer, A1-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006,
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/10/05Ilebano14336.htm (Additionally, according to Lebanon's
reconstruction chief, the conflict caused $3.6 billion worth of physical damage in Lebanon. Most
Lebanese displaced by the war have returned, but a third remains homeless because their houses are
destroyed or littered with unexploded bombs. A survey by UNICEF showed that 10 out of 12
villages visited in southern Lebanon had no water supply. The World Health Organization reported
severe damage to SOO health centers).
9.
Sara Leah Whitson, Hezbollah Needs to Answer, A1-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006,
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2006/10/05IlebanoI4336.htm; see Amnesty Int'I, Israel/Lebanon: Under
fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel, September 14,2006,
http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006.
10.
Much of the other debate focus and discussion was about the fact that Hezbollah launched
thousands of "Katyusha" rockets into densely-populated regions in Northern Israel. These types of
rockets are particularly dangerous to civilians because they are neither technologically advanced nor
can they aim for military targets with sufficient precision. Hezbollah justified the attacks on Israeli
civilians by either claiming that the rockets were indeed aimed at military targets or that such acts
were legitimate under Islamic law. On the other hand, Israel was accused of an egregiously
disproportional reaction to the kidnapping of their soldiers in violation of international humanitarian
law. Both sides also resorted to the use of cluster bombs, which are particularly condemned in the
community due to their highly destructive nature.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF HEZBOLLAH

The Lebanese Shia, driven by a desire to gather forces to fight the Israeli
occupation of southern Lebanon, founded Hezbollah (the Party of God)
in 1982.11 This movement gained momentum quickly due to logistical,
financial, and military support from both Syria and Iran. 12 Currently,
Hezbollah is an inspiration to other Islamic groups (including Hamas in
Palestine and Muqtada al-Sad's Madhi Army in Iraq) because of its
success in driving Israel out of Lebanon. 13 The group consists of several
thousand core members who function independently with some military
aid provided by Iran!4
Hezbollah's spiritual leader is Sheikh
Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah. 15 Another important member of the
organization is Imad Fayez Mugniyah, who, prior to his death on
February 13, 2008, was considered the main event planner of the
organization's military operations!6 The senior political leader, Hassan
Nasrallah, is arguably the most charismatic man in the modem Islamic
world. 17 Nasrallah was originally a military commander, but he quickly
took advantage of the intra-organizational rivalries (and his favorable
status with the head of Iran's government, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi
Khomeini) to become Hezbollah's Secretary General in 1992, and
remains there to this day. IS
According to a number of United States' intelligence reports indicate
that, in addition to Hezbollah's presence in Lebanon, Hezbollah operates
cells in Europe, Africa and both South and North America. 19 Over the
last twenty years, Hezbollah has developed a sophisticated structure. 20
The organization consists of a seven-member council called the majlis
al-shura: 21 Each member is in charge of a different function, including
II. James Brandon, Factfile: Hezhollah, Aljazeera, July 14,2006,
http://english.a1jazeera.netlEnglish! archiveiarchive?ArchiveId=24454; see also
Who are Hezhollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukI2lhi1middle_eastl43I4423.stm.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15. Council on Foreign Relations, Hezhollah, July 17,2006,
http://www.cfr.orglpublicationl9155.
16.
/d.; Imad Mugniyah was killed in a car bombing in Damascus. Hezbollah official accused
Israel of his murder, however, the Israeli government denied any involvement, more information
available at
http://www.cfr.orglpublicationlI1317/imad_mugniyah_hezboIlahs_elusive_mastennind.htmI
17.
18.
19.

/d.

Id.
Id.
20.
Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.orglmero/mero073106.html.
21.
Id.
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financial, judicial, social, political and military mattersY
When
Hezbollah first entered Lebanese politics, the organization created an
executive council and a politburo. 23
Hezbollah's decision to participate in the 1992 Lebanese elections
signaled a shift in the organization's focus from a "pan-Islamic resistance
to Israel" to the internal affairs of Lebanon. 24 This shift demonstrated
Hezbollah's growing desire to infiltrate Lebanon's political system. 25
Hezbollah has continued this transformation from a regional militia
group to a formidable political party. 26
Hezbollah's entry into mainstream Lebanese politics was aided by the
Although a
assassination of ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.27
determination as to which group caused Hariri's death has never been
made, Syria "came to figure prominently in virtually all theories about
Hariri's assassination."28 Hariri's assassination lead to a growing antiSyrian sentiment among the Lebanese. As a result, Syria withdrew all of
its troops from Lebanon. 29
The withdrawal of Syrian troops
drastically changed the balance of power in Lebanon. 3o Specifically, this
shift in power allowed Hezbollah to become the most powerful military
force in Lebanon, and allowed it to develop a presence in the Lebanese
Consequently, Hezbollah defined itself as a "force of
cabinet. 3l
resistance" not only for Lebanon, but for the entire region as a whole. 32
After the elections in 2005, Hezbollah won fourteen seats in the 128- seat

22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Who are Helbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi1middle_eastl4314423.stm.
28.
Rayyan AI-Shawaf, The Assassination of Rafik Hariri: Lebanon's Shakespearean Tragedy,
The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 7, 2006,
http://www.csmonitor.coml2006/11 07/p 16s0 I-bogn.html
29.
Id.
30.
Id. (Hezbollah and Syria, at one point, were so intrinsically linked that many viewed
Hezbollah as Syria's "Lebanese card" in their effort to regain the Golan Heights from Israel.
However, after ex-Prime Minister Harriri's assassination and the resulting withdrawal of Syrian
troops, Hezbollah has taken on position that they were opposed to Syria's withdrawal, however, they
described Syria's decision as one of "gratitude" to Lebanon and that in return Lebanon should not
sever their ties with Syria. Although Syria may still provide some support to Hezbollah, the
relationship has become a political one. Hezbollah's initial dependency on Syria has seized to exist
today).
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
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Lebanese Parliament. 33 Hezbollah also currently has two ministers in the
government. 34
In addition to Hezbollah's vital presence in the Lebanese government, it

has gathered ample popular support by providing social services and
health care to many Lebanese in the southern region. Furthermore,
Hezbollah represents the largest Lebanese community, which is the
Shiia. Under the leadership of Nasrallah, Hezbollah has helped the Shiia
community go from one of obscure and marginalized people to an
organized social and political party. 35 Hezbollah also owns the
prominent television station, al-Manar. 36
Furthermore, Hezbollah has developed a reputation, even with those who
oppose its ideals, as being an extremely capable political party on both
the national and localieveP7 Hezbollah's effectiveness has been evident
throughout Lebanon's history. For example, on May 24, 2000 the last
Israeli soldier withdrew from Lebanon. 38 Many people predicted that
after Israeli forces depart, those regions most heavily influenced by the
departure would erupt in violence. 39 However, these predictions were
never realized because Hezbollah maintained strict order in the border
regions. 40
Hezbollah's dedication to Lebanon is evident in the organization's
actions for the benefit of the country and its people. The first item on the
organization's 2005 electoral platform stated that the organization is
dedicated to:

33.
Council on Foreign Relations, Hewollah, July 17, 2006,
http://www.cfr.org/publicationl9155.
34.

[d.

35.
Interview by Kenneth Pollack with Nahum Bamea, Saban Center Kreiz Visiting Fellow
and Senior Political Analyst of Yediot Aharonot, Hisham Milhem, Washington Correspondent for
An-Nahar, Shibley Telhami, Saban Center Nonresident Senior Fellow and Anwar Sadat Professor at
the University of Maryland, Martin Indyk, Director of the Saban Center, at the Saban Center for
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution (July 17, 2006),
www.brookings.edulconun/eventsl20060717.pdf (In this expert discussion of the Israel-Lebanon
conflict, Mr. Bamea gave the Israeli perspective, Mr. Milhem, provided the. Lebanese perspective,
Ms. Telhami, commented on the view from the Arab world, and Mr.Indyk, presented policy options
for the United States) [hereinafter Saban Center Interview].
Who are Hewollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
36.
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2JhiJrniddle_eastl4314423.stm.
37. Lara Deeb, Hiwallah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero073106.htmI.
38.
39.
40.

[d.
[d.
[d.
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"safeguard Lebanon's independence and protect it from
the Israeli menace by safeguarding the Resistance,
Hezbollah's military wing and its weapons, in order to
achieve total liberation of Lebanese occupied land. "41
It is important to note that this position directly contradicts the 2004
United Nations Council Resolution 1559, which clearly called for the
disarmament of all Lebanese militia and withdrawal of foreign (mainly
Syrian) forces from Lebanon.42 With "strong Lebanese political
support," Hezbollah has used the Shebaa Farms on the Israel-Lebanon
border as a reason for refusing to demilitarize. 43 Hezbollah contends that
the Shebaa farms are occupied Lebanese territory; however, Israel asserts
that the farms are on the Syrian side of the border and therefore are part
of the occupied Golan Heights. 44
Israel's military campaign in the summer of 2006 has led to
unprecedented support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese because the
people are putting their "ideological disagreements" with Hezbollah
aside and are instead supporting the party's anti-Israeli platform. 45 In
October of 2006, 800,000 pro-Hezbollah demonstrators marched in
Beirut, a city of roughly one million people.46 Such support shows that
Hezbollah is not only an alarming military power, but also has become a
political force to be reckoned with. 47 In fact, Lebanon has called for

41.

[d.

42.
[d.; see also Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilmiddle_eastl43l4423.stm.
43.
Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/middle_eastl43l4423.stm (After Israel's withdrawal of forces from
Lebanon, Hezbollah faces one of their greatest challenges. If Israel is gone, how would Hezbollah
justify maintaining their military in Southern Lebanon? Many believe that this is why the Sheeba
Farms have become Hezbollah's "excuse" for not demilitarizing).
44.
Who are Hezbollah?, BBC News, July 13,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.ukI2lhi/middle_eastl4314423.stm; The United Nations has repeatedly requested
that both Syria and Lebanon take steps to determine the exact boundary between them in the Sebaa
Farms region, for more information, see
http://www.spot-on.comlallbrittonlUN-Report-on-lmplementation-of-170 I-Oct-31.pdf.
45. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.orglmero/mero073106.html.
46.
Sara Leah Whitson, Hezbollah Needs to Answer, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 5, 2006,
http://hrw.orglenglishldocsl2006/1O/05IlebanoI4336.htm (The exact population of Beirut is difficult
to obtain, but various estimates range from roughly 900,000 to 1.1 million people. According to the
United States Department of State, the current total population of Lebanon is approximately 3.9
million people).
47.

[d.
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Israel to be accountable for its violations throughout this conflict, but has
failed to hold Hezbollah up to the same standard. 48

III. RULES OF LAW
Fundamentally, international humanitarian law (also known as "the law
of armed conflict" or "the law of war") is a set of rules that govern how
parties and individuals should conduct themselves in times of armed
conflict. 49 The purpose of these rules is to limit the effects of armed
conflicts, to govern the methods and kind of warfare utilized, and to
protect individuals that are no longer participating in the armed conflict. 50
International humanitarian law falls under the larger umbrella of
international law, and is contained in treaties or conventions between
States and various customary laws. 51
However, international
humanitarian law must be distinguished from international human rights
law. Although the two bodies of law compliment one another, the
former applies in situations of armed conflict, whereas the latter is
tailored to protect individuals in times of peace. 52
A.

GENERAL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT: HAGUE
CONVENTIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS, ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

One of the first treaties creating rules of conduct in armed conflict was
the first Geneva Convention of 1864, which pertained only to the care of
wounded soldiers. 53 The next significant treaties were the Hague
Conventions. In 1899, the first peace conference at the Hague produced
four conventions dealing with the settlement of international disputes, the
laws and customs of war on land, and the regulation of some means of
warfare. 54 In 1907, the second Hague peace conference revised the
48.
Id. (The United Nations Human Rights Council, mainly at the request of Arab member
nation, quickly established a "commission of inquiry" to look into Israel's violations of the laws of
international armed conflict. However, the Human Rights Council refused to look at whether
Hezbollah was guilty of any violations. Therefore, as of October 2006, no international body has
investigated Hezbollah's actions in the recent conflict.)
In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law?, July 31, 2004,
49.
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtmllhumanitarian-law-factsheet.
Id.
50.
5!.
Id.
52.
In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law: Answers to your
Questions, February, 2004,
http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlalllp0703/$FileIlCRC_002_0703.PDF!Open.
In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: the core of international
53.
humanitarian law, January 9, 2006,
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtmlfgenevaconventions.
54.
Hague Convention N, Declaration 1- Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five
Years, of the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or Other New Methods of a
Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839; see also The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The
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original conventions, and created numerous other provisions with respect
to the rights and duties of States and military personnel in times of war,
the types of weapons that could be utilized, and various additions to the
rules governing the naval forces in times of war. 55 In 1949, the Geneva
Conventions were expanded into a cohesive body of law compromised of
the following four Geneva Conventions:
• Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
• Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea
• Convention (ill) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War
• Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War. 56
While the Hague Conventions established the rules governing
belligerents in armed conflicts and limited the effects of war on the

Laws of War, http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonllawofwarllawwar.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2oo7)
(The specific conventions consisted of: Hague I -- Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Hague II -- Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague III -- Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of
Principles of Geneva Convention of 1864. Hague N -- Prohibiting Launching of Projectiles and
Explosives from Balloons).
55.
Hague Convention (N) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Stat. 2277; see also The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Laws of
War, http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalonllawofwarllawwar.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2oo7) (The
specific conventions consisted of: Hague I - Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Hague II Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts, Hague III - Opening of
Hostilities, Hague N - Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague V - Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Hague VI - Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the
Outbreak of Hostilities, Hague VII - Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships, Hague VIII Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Hague IX - Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time
of War, Hague X - Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention, Hague
XI - Restrictions With Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War, Hague XIII Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War).
56.
Int'I Cornrn. of the Red Cross, The Geneva Conventions: the core of international
humanitarian law, January 9, 2oo6,
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmllgenevaconventions (A number of armed conflicts
have had an, essentially, immediate impact on the development of international humanitarian law.
For example, World War I gave rise to a number of treaties in response to the use of certain
weapons, such as poison gas, aerial bombardments and the capture of prisoners of war, in an
unprecedented manner. World War II saw a tremendous rise in the death of civilians which gave rise
to the Fourth Geneva Convention).
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enemy, the Geneva Conventions went even further.57 The Geneva
Conventions focused not only on the safety of military personnel, but on
the safety of civilians as well. 58 In 1977, the ratification of Additional
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 essentially
combined the fundamental laws and principles of the Hague and Geneva
Conventions. 59
Additional Protocol I established the rules on the conduct of hostilities.60
One of the most fundamental rules created by Additional Protocol I was
the importance of distinguishing between civilians and combatants, and
between civilian objects and military objectives. 61 Additional Protocol II
was the first international treaty devoted exclusively to protecting
civilians involved in non-international armed conflicts.62
In June of 2002, the President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross (hereafter, "ICRC"), Jakob Kellenberger, spoke about the
Additional Protocols. He stated that as controversial as the Protocols
were, they reflected the "new reality" of guerilla warfare (the central
method used by national liberation movements in their struggle for
independence). Additionally, Kellenberger stated that the Protocols gave
rise to the idea that non-international armed conflicts are a "matter of
international concern." 63
In 2006, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 became the first
international treaties to achieve universal acceptance by the 194 States in
the world. 64 Thus far, 164 States, including Lebanon (but not Israel),
have signed Additional Protocol I and 160 States, again including
Lebanon (but not Israel), have signed Additional Protocol 11.65 There are
numerous other international treaties that are significant in international

57.
Int'l Cornm. of the Red Cross, lntematioTUlI Humanitarian Law: Answers to your
Questions 4, February 2004,
http://www.icrc.orgfWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtrnlalllp0703/$FilellCRC_002_0703.PDF!Open
58.
ld.
59.
ld.
60.
Int'l Cornm. of the Red Cross, The 25 years of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, July 6, 2002, http://www.icrc.orglweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtrnl/5D6KU6.
61.
ld.
62.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol m, December 12, 1977, 1125
V.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol m.
63.
ld.
64.
Int'l Cornrn. of the Red Cross, A milestone for intematioTUlI humanitarian law, September
22, 2006, http://www.icrc.orglweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtrnl/geneva-conventions-Staternent-220906.
65.
Int'l Cornrn. of the Red Cross, The relevance of lHL in the context of terrorism, May 21,
2005, http://www.icrc.orgfWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtrnllterrorism-ihl-210705.
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law, however, in relations to this conflict, the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocols I and II are the most relevant. 66
B.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Both Israel and Lebanon are bound by those international agreements to
which they are signatories. For example, both States are parties to the
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and as such, would not be
allowed to have children under the age of 15 serve in any armed
conflict.67 The complication in any armed conflict between Hezbollah
and Israel is that Hezbollah is not a State and cannot be a signatory to an
international treaty. However, if Hezbollah is acting on behalf of
Lebanon, it would be bound by any treaty in which Lebanon is a
signatory. For example, Additional Protocols I and II bind Lebanon
because the State has signed both treaties. On the contrary, Israel has not
signed Additional Protocols I and II. Therefore, Israel is bound only to
those parts of the Protocols that have attained customary law status.
States and individuals are bound to customary international law
regardless of whether the specific State is a party to a particular treaty.68
Therefore, Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah are bound to abide by certain
rules of international humanitarian law because they are so universally
accepted that they rise to the level of customary law.

66.
Some other important international treaties include: the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg
(prohibiting the use of certain projectiles in wartime), the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition
of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of
warfare, the 1954 Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed
conflict, 1972 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of
bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and on their destruction, the 1980 Convention on
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects (CCW), which includes: the Protocol (D on
non-detectable fragments, the Protocol (m on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby
traps and other devices, the Protocol (llI) on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons, the 1993 Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and
use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, 1995 Protocol relating to blinding laser weapons,
the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1999 Protocol to the 1954 Convention on
cultural property, 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the rights of the child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict.
67.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 38, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. N44/49
(Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtmllmenu31b1k2crc.htrn
68.
Int'I Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL ill the context of terrorism,
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtmlalllterrorism-ihl-21 0705.
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C. INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW: GENERAL OVERVIEW AND
SPECIFIC ILLUSTRATION OF How PROTOCOL I AND IT APPLY TO A NONSIGNATORY PARTY SUCH As ISRAEL
Customary law comes about when a certain practice is so generally
accepted in the international community, that it essentially becomes
law.69 The fact that parties in armed conflicts must distinguish between
combatants and civilians; the fact that civilians cannot be the object of
attacks; and the notion that parties must do everything in their power to
avoid disproportionately harming civilians are all examples of customary
law (even if they have been codified in the Geneva Conventions).7o A
particular State's acceptance of a practice can be seen by looking at
official accounts of military operations, military manuals, national
legislation and case law.71 The obligation for this practice to be
"accepted as law" is called opinio juris.
Customary law plays a particularly important role in non-international
armed conflicts. Even though the majority of modem conflicts are noninternational in nature, there is still a plethora of specific rules that
govern international armed conflicts, as compared to the sparse nature of
rules governing non-international armed conflicts (as those are generally
laid out in Common Article Three and Additional Protocol ll).72
According to a study published by the ICRC in 2005, a number of crucial
customary laws define appropriate conduct in non-international armed
conflicts to a much greater extent than what can be derived from treaty
law. 73
D. ApPLICATION OF THE RULES OF LAW TO INTERNATIONAL VS. NONINTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
In international armed conflicts, essentially all of the Geneva
Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and any other international treaties
69.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary international humanitarian law: questions and
answers, August 15,2005, hUp:/Iwww.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmlJ6BPK3X.
70.
Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers on Hostilities Between Israel and
Hezbollah, July 31, 2006, hUp:/lhrw.org/english/docsl2006/07/17flebanoI3748.hUTI.
71.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary international humanitarian law: questions and
answers, August 15, 2005, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsflhtmV6BPK3X.
72.
Id.
73.
Id. (For example, no treaty expressly forbids attacks on civilian objects in non-international
armed conflicts. According to the ICRC study, this is purely a child of customary international law.
However, as with any law, customary international law is bound to be violated. The fact that such
violations are not tolerated by States only strengthens the rule in question. For example, when a
party attacks a civilian object, such attacks are not only criticized by various States, but frequently
are justified by the offending party. Both the "condemnation and justification implicitly" enforce the
idea that under customary law attacks on civilians are prohibited).
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apply to those parties that are signatories. As explained above, some
portions of treaties apply to parties who are not signatories through
customary law. In non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions applies to all parties, as it is in essence a
"catch all" article that applies regardless of the type of conflict.
Additionally, Protocol II applies to those parties that are signatories.
Otherwise, non-international armed conflicts are governed by customary
law.
The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic decision by the Appeals Chamber at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia discussed the application
of customary law to non-international armed conflicts. 74 In February of
1994, Dusko Tadic was arrested after Bosnian exiles recognized him as
one of the main Bosnian Serbs involved in the atrocities committed
against Bosnian Muslims. 75 One of the most difficult aspects of the
Tadic case from a legal perspective, was that the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia had both internal and international characteristics. 76 The
Tadic decision proved to be ground-breaking because the Appeals
Chamber concluded that the rules and principles governing international
armed conflicts would now also apply to internal armed conflicts as a
matter of customary law. 77 Prior to this decision, internal armed conflicts
were governed solely by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol 1I. 78
The Tadic decision essentially blurred the line between international and
internal armed conflict so that the rules of customary law would now
govern internal conflicts.79 The Appeals Chamber wrote that these
customary laws specifically include:
" .. .protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular
from indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian
objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in the
hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare

74.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion on
Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'II 126 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on
Jurisdiction).
75.
Major Ian G. Corey, Note, The Fine Line between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic
and the Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 Mil. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2000).
76.
Id. at 150.
77. Id. at 152.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
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proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of
certain method of conducting hostilities. "80
However, the Appeals Chamber clearly stated that not all of the rules of
international conflict apply to internal conflicts and that this gradual
extension is just that; therefore, the general meaning of the rules of
international conflict, rather that the specific regulation, apply in internal
conflicts.81
In today's world, non-international armed conflicts are rising in both
number and complexity. The application of international humanitarian
law to non-international armed conflict is difficult, because as critical as
customary law is to this practice, it has not been codified in any treaty.
Although Additional Protocol IT provides abundant guidance above
Common Article 3, it has not been universally accepted and much debate
still exists as to which parts of Additional Protocol IT are indeed
customary law. For this reason, the determination of a conflict as
international versus non-international impacts the rules of humanitarian
law to the greatest extent.

E.

APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC LAW

Humanitarian law, by its very nature, overrides some domestic criminal
and human rights law. 82 However, from a legal perspective, when armed
violence falls outside of an armed conflict, domestic and international
criminal law applies rather than humanitarian law. 83 As already
determined, international armed conflict involves armed violence
between States, and if the actions of Hezbollah are not attributed to that
of a State, then any future Israeli-Hezbollah conflict will be a noninternational armed conflict. 84 In non-international armed conflict,
neither combatant nor prisoner of war status are guaranteed, because
States are often unwilling to grant members of armed opposition groups
immunity from prosecution under domestic law. 85 Furthermore, in such
80.
Id. (citing Prosecutor V. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'lI 127 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on
Jurisdiction».
81.
Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion
on Jurisdiction in the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal, 'lI 126 (Oct.2, 1995) (Appeal on
Jurisdiction».
82.
Rona Gabor, War. International Law. and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the
Game in a New Century: Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorism: An Abundant Inventory of
Existing Tools, 5 Chi. J. Int'l L. 499, 502 (2005).
83.
Int'I Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism,
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngfsiteengO.nsflhtmlalllterrorism-ihl-210705.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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conflicts, members of organized armed groups (such as combatants and
guerrillas) are not entitled to special status or protection above and
beyond customary international law, and as such, can be prosecuted
under domestic criminal laws. 86
In the conflict, Israeli prosecutors charged three Hezbollah fighters
captured during the Israel-Lebanon conflict with the intention of trying
them for murder and for being members of a terrorist organization. 8? The
decision to try the captured Hezbollah fighters under domestic Israeli law
demonstrated that Israel refuses to view Hezbollah as a "legitimate
fighting force. "88 Israel believes that members of Hezbollah are not
entitled to prisoner of war status on capture because they do not meet the
conditions of Article 4 or Articles 43 and 44 of Additional Protocol I,
and therefore, domestic rather than international humanitarian law should
govern the actions of Hezbollah. 89 As will be demonstrated, this view
seems to blatantly contradict the status Hezbollah has achieved both
within Lebanon and in the eyes of the entire international community.

IV. ANALYSIS
UNDER
GENEVA
CONVENTIONS:
IMPLICATIONS OF HEZBOLLAH'S CLASSIFICATION
A.

HEZBOLLAH:ASTATEAcTOR?

Determining whether the acts of Hezbollah are attributable to Lebanon
has tremendous effects on exactly how international humanitarian law
would govern any future conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. If
Hezbollah's acts are attributable to Lebanon, then the conflict becomes
an international one and the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols will apply.90 Therefore, if Hezbollah is a State actor, then both
Israel and Lebanon would have to grant prisoner of war status to enemy
combatants under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 91 On the
86.
Id.
87.
Israel charges Hewollahfighters, BBC News, September 18,2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uklgofprffrf-f2fhilmiddle_eastf5355682.stm
88.
Id.
89.
Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, Univ. of
Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006,
ttp:lljurist.la w. pi tt.edufforumyl2006f07fhezbollah-israel-lebanon-and-la woof. php
90.
Jonatha Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict,
ASIL Insight, August 24, 2006, http://www.asil.orgfinsightsl2006f08finsights060824.html (Another
argument that a future Hezbollah - Israel conflict would be international is that Common Article 2
would apply when Israel attacks Lebanese territory. Specifically, because Common Article 2 applies
when there has been some kind of occupation of a High Contracting Party, even when there has been
no resistance from the State that is being occupied).
91.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Genevea Convention 111].
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other hand, if Hezbollah's acts are not attributed to a State, this
becomes a non-international armed conflict, and only Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions and customary law apply. This would mean
that Hezbollah would have to meet the definition of "other militia"
pursuant to Article 4, Section 2 to acquire prisoner of war status.92
Another relevant part of the Geneva Conventions is Common Article
Two, which applies when there has been a partial or total occupation of a
High Contracting Party (or "State").
Since Hezbollah occupies
essentially all of Southern Lebanon, this would mean that even if
Hezbollah is a non-State actor, the Geneva Conventions may apply to
that region of Lebanon. However, prior to discussing the application of
the Geneva Conventions to a non-State versus State actor, it is necessary
to determine whether Hezbollah is acting on behalf of Lebanon, or
whether they are merely a militia group on Lebanese territory.
1.

Hezbollah is Implicitly Acting on Behalf of Lebanon

Currently, the law of "State responsibility" and attribution is still in
development. 93 However, a number of international cases and the United
Nations treaty, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
provide guidance. 94 In Nicaragua V. United States, the International
92.
/d. (The detennination of whether this would be an international or non-international
conflict also detennines of when humanitarian law applies. In international armed conflict,
humanitarian law applies immediately after the first act of war or occupation occurs. However, in
non-international armed conflicts, the level of conflict must be beyond "internal disturbances and
tension" in order for humanitarian law to apply. Additionally, the classification of a future conflict
would affect when a specific individual would be prosecuted from any resulting war crimes. Since
grave breaches of the Conventions can only be committed in international armed conflicts, in such a
conflict, all States would have an obligation to prosecute suspects, regardless of where the crime
occurred).
93. As stated in The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic_decision, "International humanitarian law does
not contain any criteria unique to this body of law for establishing when a group of individuals may
be regarded as being under the control of a State, that is, as acting as de facto State officials.
Consequently, it is necessary to examine the notion of control by a State over individuals, laid down
in general international law, for the purpose of establishing whether those individuals may be
regarded as acting as de facto State officials. This notion can be found in those general international
rules on State responsibility which set out the legal criteria for attributing to a State acts performed
by individuals not having the formal status of State officials".
94. The International Law Commission has had a long history in trying to codify the law of
State responsibility which started at its very first session in 1949. The Commission actually began to
study the topic in 1955. By 1963, the Commission agreed that a report on State responsibility agreed
on the following: " (1) that priority should be given to the definitions of the general rules governing
the international responsibility of the State; and (2) that, in defining these general rules, the
experience and material gathered in certain special sectors, especially that of responsibility for
injuries to the persons or property of aliens, should not be overlooked and that careful attention
should be paid to the possible repercussions which developments in international law may have had
on State responsibility." In 1969, the Commission was ready to start working on a first set of draft
articles on the topic. The Commission stated that all future work on the topic of State responsibility
would abide by the following guidelines: "(a) The Commission intended to confine its study of
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Court of Justice held that a State may be held accountable for the actions
of State agents acting within the scope of their official capacity.95 There
are different legal outcomes when an act of a non-State group is
attributed to a State, and when a State fails to diligently meet its
obligation in preventing the acts of the non-State militia group acting on
the territory of a particular case. 96 Under the Nicaragua standard, in
order for an act of an armed non-State group to be attributable to a
particular State, the State must have "effective control", including
"financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping."97 The
"selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the
whole of its operation" is not enough to meet the Nicaragua standard.98
The Tadic decision, discussed supra, loosened the Nicaragua standard
substantially. The court in Tadic held,
" ... control by a State over subordinate armed forces or
militias or paramilitary units may be of an overall
character (and must comprise more than the mere
provision of financial assistance or military equipment
or training). This requirement, however, does not go so
far as to include the issuing of specific orders by the
State, or its direction of each individual operation.
Under international law it is by no means necessary that
the controlling authorities should plan all the operations
of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or
give specific instructions concerning the conduct of
international responsibility, for the time being, to the responsibility of States; (b) The Commission
would first examine the question of the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The
question of responsibility arising from certain lawful acts, such as space and nuclear activities,
would be examined as soon as the Commission's programme of work permitted; (c) The
Commission agreed to concentrate its study on the determination of the principles which govern the
responSIbility of States for internationally wrongful acts, maintaining a strict distinction between this
task and that of defining the rules that place obligations on States, the violation of which may
generate responsibility; (d) The study of the international responsibility of States would comprise
two broad separate phases, the first covering the origin of international responsibility and the second
the content of that responsibility" After numerous debates and drafts spanning an additional forty
years, in December of 2001, The General Assembly "took note of the articles on responsibility of
States for internationally wrongful acts." However, the adoption of these articles was moved to
2004. In 2004, the General Assembly moved the item entitled "Responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts" to its sixty-second session in 2007. A full summary of the history
behind the articles is available at the International Commis'sion of Law website at
http://untreaty.un.orglilclsummariesl9_6.htm.
95.
Maria Cristina Cardenas, Note, Columbia's Peace Process: The Continuous Search for
Peace, 15 Aa. J. Int'! L. 273, 293 (2002) (citing Nicar. v. U.S~, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)); see also
United States v. iran, 1980 ICJ 3, 19 Int'l Legal Materials 553 (1980); The Prosecutor v. Dusko
Tadic, IT-94-I-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 38 In!'1 Legal Materials 1518 (1999).
96. Jonatha Somer, Acts of Non-State Armed Groups and the Law Governing Armed Conflict,
ASIL Insight, August 24, 2006, http://www.asil.orgiinsightsl2006/08/insights060824.htrnl.
97.
[d. (citing Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 ICJ 14,25 Int'l Legal Materials 1023 (1986)).
98.

[d.
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military operations and any alleged violations of
international humanitarian law. "99
Chapter II of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts discusses attribution of conduct to a particular State. loo Article 4
States:
"Article 4: Conduct of organs of a State
I. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an
act of that State under international law, whether the
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any
other junctions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its character as
an organ of the central Government or of a territorial
unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that
status in accordance with the internal law of the
State. "101
Although, as of today, the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts is not per se binding law, even though it is cited in many
judicial decisions, including the Tadic decision supra. Based on the
aforementioned standards, whether Hezbollah's acts can be attributable
to Lebanon depends on whether Lebanon had the requisite control over
Hezbollah's military operations, and whether Hezbollah acted in their
capacity as an authority empowered by the Lebanese government.
Upon initial inspection, it would seem that under the Tadic standard,
there is no legally feasible way for Lebanon to have controlled Hezbollah
because it did not provide the majority of Hezbollah's military
equipment or training (particularly in light of the fact that the general
sentiment is that both financial and military support for Hezbollah comes
from Iran). However, upon further investigation, it becomes clear that
99.
Jd. (citing The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, IT-94-I-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 38 Int'I
Legal Materials 1518 (1999» (Paragraphs 98-145 of The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic fully discuss the
Nicaragua standard, http://www.un.orglicty/tadic/appeaVjudgementlindex.htrn. It may also be
helpful to look at the International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility. The articles,
arguably, encompass customary law and State that both "control and "acknowledgment" are basis
for State responsibility).
100.
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56.83, U.N. Doc.
A/56/l0 (Dec. 12,2001),
http://untreaty.un.orglilc/textslinstrumentslenglishldraft%20articles/9_6_200 1. pdf
101.

Jd.
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Hezbollah has achieved such significant status in Lebanese politics and
culture that they are no longer a "subordinate" group under Lebanon's
control. In fact, Hezbollah has cemented their position in Lebanon to
such a degree (with the government's consent and encouragement), that
Lebanon and Hezbollah have indeed become one.
Further, it is important to remember that in this conflict, Israel invaded
Lebanon and attacked various parts of the country, thereby expanding
their targets beyond the Hezbollah-occupied region of southern Lebanon.
Israeli officials have stated numerous times that Israel was not merely
responding to the actions of Hezbollah, but to the State of Lebanon as
well. 102 However, the official Lebanese army did not responded to any
military action by Israel nor did the army instigate any offensive military
action. 103
Lebanon did not investigate Hezbollah's activities, nor did Lebanon go
after Nasrallah and try to stop his attacks on Israel. Israel was attacking
Lebanon from every direction and the only party that responded was
Hezbollah. Fundamentally, if a State were attacked by a neighboring
State, the former would respond. If the attacked State has an army, it
would send its troops to defend itself. However, Lebanon did not deploy
its "official" army. Instead, Lebanon fully supported its real army,
Hezbollah, to defend the country against Israel.
Those in support of the argument that Hezbollah is a non-State actor
would argue that mere passive permission on the part of Lebanon is
insufficient for attribution. However, from a historical perspective,
Lebanon has not been a "passive" government. On the contrary, the
Lebanese government has been vocal, and based on the experience of the
Lebanese Civil War, has not allowed one group to dominate. For
example, when ex-Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated, the Lebanese
government publicly criticized Hezbollah for refusing to demilitarize. 104
During this time, the multi-fractioned Lebanese government was very
much against allowing one group, even the largest one in the country, to
maintain its military force. However, in this conflict, Lebanon did not
stop Hezbollah from using this military force, nor did it stop Hezbollah
from upgrading to modern weapons and technologies. Decisions about
war are generally made by the sovereign Lebanese government.
However, not only did Lebanon allow Hezbollah to engage in an armed
102.
Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers on Hostilities Between Israel and
Hezbollah, July 31,2006, http://hrw.org/englishldocs/2006/07/17I1ebanoI3748.htm.
103.
Id.
104.
Saban Center Interview, supra note 33.
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conflict with Israel, but even in the year after the conflict, the Lebanese
government had not questioned Hezbollah's actions. Lebanon's implicit
support of Hezbollah, and refusal to intervene in any manner, implies
that Hezbollah was indeed acting on behalf of Lebanon, and was
therefore, a State actor.
Furthermore, in the 1990's Lebanon and Israel entered into an agreement
not to target civilians in any future armed conflicts. The rules arising out
of that agreement have governed the Israeli-Lebanese border dispute. lOS
Although the State of Lebanon and Israel entered into this agreement, in
reality, any border dispute has always been between Israel and
Hezbollah. As such, Lebanon knowingly has and continues to allow
Hezbollah to control the border between Israel and Lebanon. It seems, at
the very least unusual for a State to allow any guerrilla, terrorist, or
militia group to control its borders when its own army is capable of
doing so. If Lebanon is comfortable allowing an organized military
group to both control and defend its borders, this only further supports
the notion that Hezbollah is a Lebanese-sponsored State actor.
Finally, Hezbollah themselves purport to act on behalf of Lebanon. On
August 3, 2006, Hezbollah's chief Nasrallah made a televised offer to
Israel to stop flring Hezbollah rockets in exchange for an end to Israeli
air strikes on Lebanon.106 However, Nasrallah warned that Hezbollah
would flre rockets at Tel Aviv if Israel attacked Beirut. 107 Nasrallah
stated:

"If you attack our cities, villages and capital, we will
react. And any time you decide to stop your attacks on
our cities, villages and infrastructure, we will not fire
rockets on any Israeli settlement or city. Naturally, we

105. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31, 2006,
http://www.merip.orglmero/mero073106.html; see also see also Human Rights Watch Arms Project,
Civilian Pawns:Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border, May
1996, http://hrw.orglreportsIl996Ilsrael.htm ('These "rules of the game" came out of Israel's
bombing Beirut a number of times in the nineties, causing relatively large civilian deaths. For
example, in 1996, Israel bombed a United Nations bunker in Qana, Lebanon. Many civilians had
taken refuge in the bunker and as a result of the attack, 106 civilians died).
106.
Andrew McGregor, Hezbollah's Rocket Strategy, 4 Terrorism Monitor 16 (2006).
107. Id.; see also Anmesty Int'l, IsraellLebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern
Israel, September 14, 2006, hnp:llweb.amnesty.orgllibraryllndexlENGMDE020252006 (On July 14,
2006 Nasrallah stated, "You wanted open warfare, and we are going into open warfare. We are ready
for it, a war on every level." Two days Hezbollah bombed the city of Haifa even though a large
Arabic population resides in Haifa. After another attack on Haifa in August, Nasrallah stated that
Hezbollah bombed Haifa in "response to Zionist attacks against the southern suburbs [of Beirut] and
the rest of the Lebanese territory ... ").
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would rather, in case of fighting, fight soldier to soldier
on the group and battlefield. "108
Hezbollah's repetitive use of the word "our" implies that Hezbollah
believes it was acting on behalf of Lebanon. Moreover, most of
Nasrallah's speeches aired on the very popular Hezbollah television
station al-Manar. The fact that the Lebanese government has constantly
failed to act in response to Hezbollah, only confirms that Lebanon was
indeed sponsoring Hezbollah's activity with full knowledge of
Hezbollah's strategic plan and military objectives.
Hezbollah's accomplishments with respect to the conflict only support
the notion that Hezbollah has essentially morphed into the true Lebanese
army. After all, it was Hezbollah and not the "official" Lebanese army
that responded to each Israeli attack. Hezbollah was able to abduct two
Israeli soldiers, bomb a tank which crossed the border in order to follow
the kidnappers, and conduct an overall military campaign into regions of
Israel that were never reached by weapons from Lebanon. Additionally,
Hezbollah has fixed training bases, rocket-launching facilities, and
trained artillerymen. 109 A senior United States military official stated, in
reference to Hezbollah, that "[the] analysis around here is they have
more expertise than the Lebanese military."11O The Lebanese army is
"lightly armed, poorly organized for maneuver warfare and lacked both a
meaningful air force and modem-based air defence assets."lll The
Lebanese army has 70,000 men, and while still recovering from twenty
years of civil war, it is the only Lebanese military force capable of any
serious military action because Lebanon has no real air force or navy.ll2
Moreover, Hezbollah has demonstrated some serious technological
advancement in the conflict. Not only did Hezbollah utilize cluster
munitions for the first time, but they used the Chinese-made Type-81
122mm rocket (an inaugural use of this type of rocket in the world).ll3
108.
Amnesty Int'!, Israel/Lebanon: Under fire: Hizbullah's attacks on northern Israel,
September 14, 2006, http://web.amnesty.orgllibrarylIndexlENGMDE020252006 (citing a speech
broadcast by Al-Manar TV station, Arabic text: Ad-Diyar website, IS July 2006 pdf edition,
English text: www.islamicdigesLnetlv611contentiviewl1870101 and
www.aimislam.comlforums/index.php?showtopic=457).
109.
Peter Spiegel & Sebastian Rotella, Hezbollah's Skill More Military Than Militia, Los
Angeles Times, July 20, 2006, http:/www.iiss.orglindex.asp?pgid=14309.
110.
Id.
111.
Estanislao Oziewicz, What rules govern the conflict?, The Int'l Institute for Strategic
Studies, July 19, 2006, http://www.iiss.orglwhats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july2006/what-rules-govern-the-conflict.
112.
Id.
113.
Human Rights Watch, Lebanon/Israel: Hezbollah Hit Israel with Cluster Munitions
During Conflict, October 19, 2006, http://hrw.orglenglishldocs12006110118Ilebanol4412.htm
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This shows that Hezbollah is not only capable of being a national army,
but has potentially become one. 114
The strongest argument that Hezbollah is not acting on behalf of
Lebanon is that Iran and Syria are the ones assisting Hezbollah with both
financing as a whole, and military operations specifically. As such, an
argument could be made that under the Nicaragua and Tadic standard,
Hezbollah is not a State-sponsored actor, but rather an organized political
government that is merely occupying Lebanese territory and supporting
itself with the funds of other States. This argument has validity because
Hezbollah is a recognized political party in both Syria and Iran.
Additionally, during the conflict, an Iranian military source revealed to
the London Arabic daily newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, that Iran
provided overall military support and weapons to Hezbollah "in defense
of Lebanon."115 Specifically, the Iranian official stated:
"The Revolutionary Guards .... equipped Hezbollah with
mobile bases, [i.e.] medium-sized trucks that can carry
and launch missiles. Between 1992 and 2005, Hizbullah
received approximately 11,500 missiles and rockets, 400
short- and medium- range pieces of artillery, [and]
Aresh, Nun and Hadid rockets. Last year, Hizbullah first
received a shipment of large 'Uqab missiles with
333-millimeter warheads, and an enormous supply of
SAM7 shoulder-[fired] anti-aircraft missiles as well as
C802 missiles, copied from Chinese missiles, two of

(Cluster munitions are particularly dangerous to civilians because they spread "submunitions" over a
very large area thereby guaranteeing casualties. Moreover, cluster munitions leave behind a large
quantity of "duds" that essentially turn into landmines and either kill or injure civilians after the
conflict has seized. These types of weapons have also been used in the iraq, Afghanistan, and
Kosovo conflict, many nations have joined to prohibit the use of cluster munitions due to the danger
posed to civilians during and after a particular conflict. In November of 2006, The Review
Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons began looking into this problem).
114.
Saban Center Interview, supra note 33.
Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, University
115.
of Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforumyl2006/07Ihezbollah-israel-lebanon-and-law-of.php; see also
Andrew McGregor, Hezbollah's Rocket Strategy, 4 Terrorism Monitor 16, (2006) (The introduction
of long-range Iranian Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets has allowed Hezbollah to expand their targets beyond
the thinly-populated area in Northern Israel. The Fajr-3 has a range of 45 kilometers and carries a 45
kilogram warhead. Another grave concern to Israel, is Hezbollah's possession of the Iranian Zelzal 2
missile which has a range of 60-240 miles and would, in effect, put all Israeli cities within range of
southern Lebanon).
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which were used in the attack on the Israeli ship the day
before yesterday. "116
A senior United States military official commented that the missiles used
in the attack on the Israeli ship off the coast of Beirut were "fired by
Hezbollah themselves, [and] they would have had to have training in
these missile technologies."ll7 The official also noted that such training
would probably come from Iranian military schools or from people
trained in Iran. liS According to a London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Hezbollah possesses 13,000 missiles and rockets,
11,000 of which were shipped from Iran. I 19
While it is clear that Iran has and continues to provide military support to
Hezbollah, Iran does not dictate Hezbollah's behavior, nor does it direct
the group's actions. 120 Although Hezbollah faithfully follows the
traditional "rule of the clerics" promoted by Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini,
while Iran still provides some military and financial support, Hezbollah's
relationship with Iran is now based upon consultations with Iranian
leaders, rather than on Hezbollah members acting as Iranian puppets. 121
Iran may have had more control over the group at the beginning,
however, Iran has lost much of that control because its desire to
influence Lebanese politics have strengthened Lebanese nationalism and
support of Hezbollah. 122 Although Iran has lost a great deal of control
over Hezbollah's members, it still provides them with military support
and training. Does this fact lead to the conclusion that Hezbollah is
acting on behalf of Iran? The Tadic standard requires "overall control"
beyond merely financing or military support in order for Iran to have
control over Hezbollah. The bottom line is that under the Tadic
standard, the mere fact that Iran has provided military support to
Hezbollah does not negate the idea that Hezbollah is acting on behalf of
Lebanon.
116.
Dr. Robbie Sabel, Hezbollah. Israel. Lebanon and the Law of Armed Conflict, University
of Pittsburgh School of Law: Jurist Legal News and Research, July 25, 2006,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforurny/2006/07lhezbollah-israel-Iebanon-and-Iaw-of.php
117. Peter Spiegel & Sebastian Rotella, Hezbollah's Skill More Military Than Militia, Los
Angeles Times, July 20, 2006, http:/www.iiss.orglindex.asp?pgid=14309.
118.
Id.
119.
Estanislao Oziewicz, What rules govern the conflict?, The International Institute for
Strategic Studies. July 19.2006,
http://www.iiss.orglwhats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/what-rules-govemthe-conflict (There are also reports that the largest weapons in Hezbollah' s missile arsenal are likely
to be at least partially manned by members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards).
120. Lara Deeb, Hizballah: A Primer, Middle East Reporter Online, July 31. 2006.
http://www.rnerip.orglmero/rnero073106.html.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
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Lebanon has pennitted Iran to pass weapons and potentially train
Hezbollah on their territory. In order for Iran to ship weapons to
Hezbollah, they would have to use Lebanese ports; therefore, Lebanon
must have been aware that Hezbollah was obtaining weapons. Similarly,
the Taliban government pennitted Al Queda to conduct "planning,
training, and financing operations" within Taliban-controlled territory.123
The United States, relying on the draft of the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts attributed responsibility for AI Queda's
actions on September 11, 2001 to the Taliban regime because of the
latter's tolerance of AI Queda's activity on their sovereign territory.124
The sovereignty of a State implies an obligation to prevent that State's
territory from becoming a "staging area for armed attacks."I25 With this
in mind, Lebanon had the responsibility to assure that Hezbollah was not
using Lebanese territory to prepare for attacks against Israel. Lebanon
was unlikely merely a "passive" player that did not
provide any
financial aid to Hezbollah.
Hezbollah occupies a large part of Lebanon and provides services to
many of the country's Shiia majority. Why would Lebanon allow a
group to have so much control without providing it with some kind of
funding? Moreover, it seems equally unlikely that the Lebanese
government was unaware of Hezbollah's military plans in the conflict.
After all, when Israel attacked Lebanon, the responding military power
was Hezbollah. From a purely logical perspective, the Lebanese
government would want to know how Hezbollah is defending the
nation's civilians.
Undoubtedly, the argument that Hezbollah is acting on behalf of
Lebanon is not purely black and white, particularly in light of the fact
that State responsibility is an area of law that is still highly debated in the
international community. However, Hezbollah has become an intrinsic
part of the Lebanese government, social structure, and culture. The
Lebanese government did nothing to curb Hezbollah' s acts of aggression
against Israel, nor have they looked into Hezbollah's activity since.
Lebanon has given the rest of the world the perception that when Israel
123. Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and the Rule of Law, 25 Hastings Int'I &
Compo L. Rev. 303, 306 (2002).
124.
Id. (Many uncertainties still exist concerning the rules of attribution for acts conducted by
guerrilla forces. The draft articles on Responsibility of Staes for internationally wrongful acts are not
completely clear on the issue either).
125.
Id. ("The United Nations General Assembly defined "aggression" as "the sending by or on
behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to [acts of aggression committed directly by
the State], or of its substantial involvement therein. G.A. Res. 3314, Dec. 14, 1974, U.N. Doc.
N9631 (1975)).
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attacks Lebanon, Hezbollah defends.
As stated in Article 7 of
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts:

"Article 7: Excess of authority or contravention of
instructions
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or
entity empowered to exercise elements of the
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the
State under international law if the organ, person or
entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its
authority or contravenes instructions. "126
Lebanon has empowered Hezbollah to do what the Lebanese government
is supposed to control. Specifically, it has allowed Hezbollah to make
decisions in times of armed conflict and provide a military defense for
the country. Therefore, Hezbollah is a State actor by implication.
2.

Application of the Geneva Conventions

If Hezbollah is a State actor, then all of the Geneva Conventions would
apply to a future conflict between Israel and Lebanon, as both States are
signatory parties to the Conventions. Additional Protocol I would also
apply to Lebanon, as it is a signing party to that treaty. The application
of Additional Protocol I to Israel is a more complex issue, as Israel is not
a signatory to Protocol I. Under these circumstances, customary law
plays a crucial role within international humanitarian law.

States cannot avoid responsibility by merely arguing that they are not a
party to a certain international treaty. 127 This is because numerous
principles laid out in the Protocols are considered customary law, as they
are supported by both non-signatory and signatory States to a particular
international treaty.128 With respect to Protocol I, Israel could try arguing

126.

Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56.83, U.N. Doc.

Al56/10 (Dec. 12,2001),

http://untreaty. un.orglilc/texts/instrurnents/englishldraft% 20articles/9_6_200 I. pdf.
127. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism,
http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsflhtmllterrorism-ihl-210705.
128. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Study on Customory International Humonitarian Law, July
21, 2005, http://www.icrc.org Iweb/englsiteengO.nsflhtmllcustomary-law-statement-210705 (The
study on customary law is the outcome of eight years of research covering State practices from all
over the world. The idea behind the study was to capture the "clearest possible 'photograph '" of
modem customary law. The study would include those principles as "customary" that were
supported by all States and identify those rules and principles still debated. The parts of treaties that
caused disagreement were not included as the rules of customary law (for example, the presumption
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that unlike the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I is not as
strongly rooted in customary law.
However, unlike the Geneva
Conventions which have been signed by all parties, the Protocols have
not gained such universal recognition. 129 However, not only do many
States uphold the fundamental principles in both Protocols, but a
substantial number of States are signatories to the Protocols.
If Hezbollah is determined to be a non-State Actor, then Common Article

3 would be the only applicable part of the Geneva Conventions. This
Article lays out the fundamental rules of a non-international conflict and
protects those individuals that are no longer taking an active part in the
armed conflict. 130 The Article prohibits murder, mutilation, torture, cruel
treatment, the taking of hostages, and outrages upon personal dignity (in
particular, humiliating and degrading treatment).131 The Article also
requires that sentences be passed with the observance of "all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."132 The protections of Common Article 3 have become so
fundamental in the laws of armed conflict, that they are now referred to
as "elementary considerations of humanity" that must be observed in any
type of armed conflict. 133 Common Article 3 is the foundation of
international humanitarian law and applies regardless of the type of
conflict or the classification of the individual.
In addition to Common Article 3, it is possible that Common Article 2
would apply in a non-international conflict. Article 2 states that:

"In addition to the provisions which shall be
implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the

of civilian status in situations where doubt about such a status exists). The 5,OOO-page study
produced 161 rules of customary law).
129.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A milestone for international humanitarian law,
September 22, 2006,
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtmIlgeneva-conventions-Statement-220906.
130.
Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 3.
131.
Id.
/d.
132.
133.
In!'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Developments of us policy and legislation towards
detainees: the ICRC position, October 19, 2006,
http://www.icrc.orglweb/engisiteengO.nsflhtrnlall/kelIenberger-interview-191 006 ?opendocument
(Preserving the integrity of Common Article 3 is extremely important because it applies to the
treatment of all individuals who fall in enemy hands without any regard to how the conflict or the
individual is classified. Common Article 3, along with the rest of the Geneva Conventions, was
written after one of the darkest period in time. The "totality" of Article 3 reflects that).
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if the state of war is not

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting
Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance. "134
The language of Article 2 would make it applicable to Hezbollah in a
non-international armed conflict because Hezbollah occupies essentially
all of southern Lebanon (a territory of a High Contracting Party), and the
occupation was met without resistance. However, according to Jean
Pictet, one of the main authors of the Geneva Conventions, the second
paragraph of Article 2 "was intended to fill the gap left by paragraph
1."135 Pictet continues to explain that "paragraph 2 was designed to
protect the interests of protected persons in occupations achieved without
hostilities when the government of the occupied country considered that
armed resistance was useless."\36 This explanation of the seemingly
all-encompassing meaning of paragraph 2 also accounts for why
Common Article 2 rarely applies in modem armed conflicts and why it
also would not apply to Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah has occupied
Lebanese territory for decades, it has neither achieved such occupation
without hostilities, nor has Lebanon ever considered an armed resistance
to Hezbollah as futile. As a matter of fact, as illustrated in the 2006
conflict, Lebanon has allowed Hezbollah to act on Lebanon's behalf, to
control the Lebanese border, and to impact every aspect of Lebanese
social and political culture.
Similar to Common Article 2, it would seem (at least on its face) that
Article 4 of Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War may also apply to Hezbollah in a non-international armed
conflict:

"(2) Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied provided that such militias or

134. Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 2.
135. Michael W. Reisman & James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?,
82 AJ.I.L. 459, 461 (July, 1988) (citing 3 The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.
Commentary 22-23 (1. Pictet ed. 1952-60) (4 vols., one on each Convention».
136.

[d.
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volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at
a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war. "137
Nevertheless, Article 4 would not provide significant protection to
Hezbollah in a non-international armed conflict. Even if Hezbollah
"belongs" to Lebanon for the purposes of this law, Hezbollah does not
fulfill all of the conditions required for protection under Article 4.
Hezbollah meets the first element because the group is commanded by a
person who is responsible for his subordinates. It could also meet the
second requirement of having an identifying sign or uniform that is
easily recognizable. Although the group does not actually have such a
sign, due to the modern nature of armed conflict, armed forces are not
required to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and could, for
example, carry arms openly to sufficiently distinguish themselves. 138
However, Hezbollah (like many other similar organizations) does not
carry arms openly, but rather blends in with civilians. This is one of the
main reasons why Hezbollah fighters are difficult to capture and
distinguish. 139 Therefore, Hezbollah does not meet the third requirement
of Article 4, because Hezbollah members, as a matter of strategy, do not
carry weapons openly. Hezbollah would also have difficulty meeting the
fourth requirement of Article 4 because it has repeatedly violated the
laws and customs of war (as reported by the ICRe, Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International, major newspapers, and in numerous legal
137. Geneva Convention ill, supra note 89, art. 4 (Additionally, Article 5 dictates that: "Should
any doubt arise as to whether, persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Articie 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by
a competent tribunal." Even with Article 4 and 5 of the Geneva Conventions, according to Amnesty
International, neither Israel nor Hezbollah have treated captured combatants as prisoners of war).
138. 1n!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism,
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlalllterrorism-ihl-210705.
139. Israel has used this as a defense on numerous occasions, claiming that they did not violate
the laws of armed conflict because they were not targeting civilians but rather Hezbollah.
Nonetheless, the majority opinion, based on both the Geneva Conventions and the fundamental
principle of customary law, holds Israel responsible for indiscriminate attacks on Lebanese civilians.
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opinions). For example, in the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah indiscriminately
attacked civilians utilizing-weapons such as "Katyusha" rockets, which
are so technologically lacking that they frequently miss their supposed
military targets and kill or injure civilians instead.
Unlike an international armed conflict where the Geneva Conventions
and parts of Additional Protocol I would apply to Hezbollah, in a
non-international conflict, only Common Article 3 would apply. As
always, customary law would also govern Hezbollah's conduct.
However, neither Common Article 2 nor Article 4 of Geneva Convention
III would apply. Based on the analysis thus far, it would seem that in a
non-international armed conflict, Hezbollah would not be able to obtain
prisoner of war protection because they do no meet the requirements of
"organized militia" under Article 4.
B.

"COMBATANT" CLASSIFICATION

Guerrilla warfare has been a part of armed conflict for many centuries,
and is currently the most common form of warfare. 140 Prior to Additional
Protocol I, the treatment of guerrillas was governed by Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention. One of the main problems with the guerrilla
classification is that guerrillas will infrequently meet the requirements of
Article 4. Usually, guerilla fighters are part-time soldiers who have to
live as "normal civilians" in order to survive in their respective
communities. 141
Another point of concern under the guerrilla classification is that an
occupying power can deny prisoner of war treatment to captured
guerrillas based on a number of exceptions that exist in the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949. 142 First, the occupying party would refuse to
recognize the party to the conflict that the guerrillas are a part of. 143
Second, normally, members of armies do not lose their prisoner of war
status no matter what kind of violations of humanitarian law they
commit. l44 However, guerrillas are held to a higher standard, and under
Article 4, may be denied prisoner of war status because the captors

140.
Rev. 79
141.
142.
143.
144.

John Dwight Ingram, The Geneva Convention is Woefully Outdated, 23 Penn St. Int'l L.
(2004) (citing as examples the conflicts in Somalia and Afghanistan).
George Aldrich, New Lifefor the Laws of War, 75 AJ.I.L. 764, 769 (1981).
[d.
[d.
[d.
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believe that the guerrilla group (in whole or in part) has not sufficiently
complied with the laws of armed conflict. 145
As a response to some of these issues, Articles 43 through 47 of
Additional Protocol I created a uniform set of rules applicable to all
combatants (both regular and irregular). The Articles prescribe some,
albeit limited, exceptions for those guerrillas that take advantage of their
civilian status and conceal weapons while moving into position for an
attack. 146 Article 43 defines the term "combatant," stating (in relevant
part):
"1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of
all organized armed forces, groups and units which are
under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. "147

Article 44 discusses that combatants are guaranteed prisoner of war
status, stating (in relevant part):
"1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls
into the power of an adverse Party shall be a prisoner of
war.
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are
obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a
military operation preparatory to an attack.
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed
conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall
retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such
situations, he carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and

145.
[d.
146. Id. at 770.
147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Intemational Anned Conflicts (Protocol n art 43, December 12,1977,1125
V.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol 1].
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(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary
while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding
the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse
Party while failing to meet the requirements set forth in
the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right
to be a prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be
given protections equivalent in all respects to those
accorded to prisoners of war by the Third
Convention ... "148
These articles also give guerrillas and other irregular armed forces
presumptive prisoner of war status that would no longer depend on
whether the occupying power deemed them worthy of such status. 149
Additionally, Article 44 clarified that combatants (including guerrillas)
must distinguish themselves from the civilian population only while they
are engaged in an attack or in preparation for an attack. 150
Of significant importance is that Protocol I grants prisoner of war status
to those individuals who lawfully participate in armed conflicts.l5l Under
Protocol I, to be a "lawful" member of an armed force (whether a
guerrilla group or lawful combatant), armed forces must be organized, be
under a command responsible to that party, and be subject to an internal
disciplinary system that enforces compliance with humanitarian law. 152
Further, members must distinguish themselves from the civilian
population in order to be entitled to prisoner of war status. 153
As explained supra, Israel does not and would not want to recognize
Hezbollah as anything other than a terrorist group in any future armed
conflicts. Israel would classify Hezbollah members as terrorists that do
not warrant any protections under Additional Protocol I because they
cannot be given combatant status. Since Additional Protocol I only
provides protection to those groups that act on behalf of a State or entity
that is subject to international law, terrorist groups acting on their own
behalf do not receive prisoner of war protection. 154 According to the
148.
Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 44
75 A.l.l.L. at 771.
149.
150.
Id. at 774.
151.
In!'1 Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism,
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlaIVterrorism-ihl-21 0705.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism,
May 21, 2005, http://www.icrc.orglWeblEngisiteengO.nsflhtmlaIVterrorism-ihl-21070S.
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ICRC, Additional Protocol I does not grant prisoner of war status to
those who unlawfully participate in hostilities because Protocol I
recognizes and protects only those organizations (and their respective
members) who act either on behalf of a State or an "entity" that meets the
criteria established by the Protocol and, therefore, are governed by
internationallaw. 155
Israel would argue that Hezbollah members are not combatants because
Hezbollah is not the official Lebanese army. Specifically, Lebanon did
not explicitly recognize Hezbollah as its armed forces in the conflict, nor
did Hezbollah wear the uniform of the Lebanese army. Israel would also
rely on the fact that Hezbollah's fighters (and their weapons) are hidden
among civilians. 156 Therefore, Israel would argue that this clearly
supports the notion that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, rather than
a State party or combatant.
However, Israel's potential arguments lack merit with respect to
Hezbollah's combatant status. Hezbollah's ability in the conflict to
utilize complex weapons provides strong basis for the argument that it
has transitioned from guerilla group to a viable military power. For
Hezbollah to qualify as a "combatant" under Article 43, it would have to
be an organized unit which would be under a command responsibility to
Lebanon for the conduct of its members. Hezbollah is clearly an
organized unit. As illustrated above, throughout the conflict, Hezbollah
was the only group fighting on behalf of Lebanon in defense of Israeli
attacks. This implies that Hezbollah was under command responsibility
to Lebanon for all of its military strategies and activities.
However, even as combatants, Hezbollah would very likely be unable to
receive prisoner of war protections because of the manner in which they
conduct themselves in armed conflicts. Hezbollah's policy and the secret
to its effectiveness is the mariner in which the group blends in with the
civilian population. Even if Hezbollah is compromised of combatants,
its members do not carry arms openly during military engagements.
Therefore, even if Hezbollah were to receive combatant status pursuant
to Article 44, Paragraph 3(a), it fails to meet one of the requirements
necessary to attain prisoner of war status as a combatant. Even if
155. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross. The relevance of IHL in the context of terrorism.
May 21. 2005. http://www.icrc.orglWeblEnglsiteengO.nsUhtmlaIlfterrorism-ihl-210705 (The ICRC
goes further stating that the Protocol purposefully excludes "private wars" in the same manner that
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1907 Hague Regulations have done in regards to the laws of
war on land).
156. Anthony Dworkin. The Middle East Crisis and International Law. Crimes of War Project.
July 18. 2006. http://www.crimesof war.orglonnews/news-middleeast.html.
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Hezbollah's members are considered to be terrorists rather than
combatants, they would still receive the fundamental protections laid out
in Common Article 3 and would be subject to customary law 10 any
future armed conflict.
The analysis of whether Hezbollah deserves "combatant" status changes
dramatically in a non-international conflict because Additional Protocol I
would not apply. Although Common Article 3 would still apply in a
non-international armed conflict, Hezbollah would mainly have to abide
by customary law. Additional Protocol II also provides guidance in this
type of armed conflict. Since Lebanon is a party to Additional Protocol
II, and Hezbollah would be acting on the State's behalf as combatants,
Hezbollah would have to abide by all the rules laid out in Protocol II.
These include: prohibitions against certain inhumane acts against
individuals who do not take a direct part in the armed conflict; respect
and protection for the wounded; and special protection of children. 157

C.

"MERCENARY" CLASSIFICATION

Mercenarism has long been one of the elements of traditional armed
conflict.l58 Generally, mercenarism is strongly discouraged under
internationallaw.159 By their very definition, mercenaries pose a threat
because they intensify existing conflicts. For example, the United
Nations has stated that mercenarism is a destabilizing force and impedes
the sovereign rights of both the people and the State.160 Additionally,
under the International Criminal Court, traditional mercenaries may be
tried for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. 161
However, an individual who technically meets the definition of
"mercenary" can still obtain prisoner of war status by enlisting in the
armed forces of the hiring party until the conflict ends.162 For this
reason, the definition of "mercenary" in Additional Protocol I has been
criticized. 163
In 1989, the International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries tried to
expand the definition by shifting to the purpose for why a particular
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Geneva Protocol II, supra note 60, art..4,7, 13.
James R. Coleman, Constraining Modem Mercenarism, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, 1496
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Id. at 1493.
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David Kassebaum, Note, A Question of Facts - The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in
Bosnia, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 581, 589 (2000).
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Id. at 590.
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individual was hired.164 However, although this was adopted by the
General Assembly, the "Mercenary Convention" has not received
sufficient ratification as only seventeen (rather than twenty-two) nations
have ratified it.165 Neither Israel nor Lebanon have ratified the
Convention. 166
One could argue that Hezbollah classifies as a group of mercenaries if
one believes that Hezbollah is merely being paid to act out the wishes of
a State, whether Lebanon or Iran. 167 Additional Protocol I, Article 47
lays out six elements defining a "mercenary" as any person who:
"(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to
fight in an armed conflict;
(b) d.')es, infact take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially
by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised,
by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material
compensation substantially in excess of that promised or
paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and
(j) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to

the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed
forces. "168

Article 47 also removes the protection of combatant or prisoner of war
status from mercenaries provided that an individual cumulatively meets
all of the definitional elements above. 169
164.
[d. (citing International Convention against the Recruiunent, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries, U.N. GAOR, 72nd pie. Mtg., U.N. Doc. AlRES/44/34 (1989)).
165.
[d. at 591.
166. As of 1999, the 17 parties that have ratified the treaty are Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus,
Cameroon, Cyprus, Georgia, Italy, Maldives, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Suriname, Togo, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
167. Due to their limited financial involvement with Hezbollah, as of today, Syria does not
seem a likely State to hire Hezbollah as their mercenaries.
168. Geneva Protocol I, supra note 145, art. 47.
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An argument could be made that Additional Protocol I would not apply
to a future armed conflict because Lebanon signed the treaty, and
Hezbollah has no international standing or ability to be a party to
international treaties. While this would be true (as explained above), the
international community and the majority of States (including all the
ones that have ratified Protocol I) condemn mercenarism. Therefore, this
particular part of Additional Protocol I would apply to Hezbollah under
customary law. Article 47 summarizes and codifies the definitional
elements that have come to be associated with mercenarism. Therefore,
whether Hezbollah can be defined as a mercenary group can be analyzed
using the framework laid out in Article 47.
The first element of Article 47 requires a member of Hezbollah to be
recruited locally or abroad in order to engage in an armed conflict with
Israel. Although this may have been true initially when Hezbollah's
dependence on Iran and Syria was at its peak, this is no longer true today.
Neither Iran, Lebanon nor Syria recruit Hezbollah in order to fight Israel.
Quite the contrary, Hezbollah organized the conflict in question and
continued to take full credit for every attack thereafter. Even if Iran
helped Hezbollah by providing weapons, Hezbollah has infiltrated
Lebanon to the point that it does not need to be "recruited" in order to
carry out aggressions against Israel.
The second element would require Hezbollah to take part in the
hostilities, which Hezbollah has clearly done. However, the third
element requires that Hezbollah be "materially compensated" for
maintaining an armed conflict with Israel above and beyond members of
the hiring State's regular armed forces. In the conflict, Hezbollah carried
out the entire war without the involvement of either Lebanon's or Iran's
armed forces.
Potentially, an argument could be made that Iran's armed forces were
indeed involved in the fighting. Quite possibly some members of Iran's
army aided Hezbollah by physically engaging in the conflict. However,
even Iran's own military official admitted that Iran's major part in the
2006 conflict was to provide Hezbollah with weapons, not military
manpower. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Iran, Lebanon, or
Syria paid Hezbollah compensation at all (either above or below what
they would pay their own armed forces).

169.
38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. at 589 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47).
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Since Hezbollah is, at the very least, a resident of Lebanon (and Lebanon
controlled and was a Party to the conflict), the organization does not
meet the next requirement either. Technically, Hezbollah meets the
requirements of the fifth and sixth elements because Hezbollah was not a
member of the Lebanese armed forces, and was not sent by a State which
was not a Party to the conflict on any sort of official duty.
If Hezbollah were to attain the classification of "mercenaries," only
Common Article Three would apply in any future armed conflict.
However, since Hezbollah does not meet all of the elements set forth by
the definition, the type of international humanitarian law that would
apply depends on whether this is an international or non-international
armed conflict. As always, regardless of what classification Hezbollah
falls under, international customary law applies.

v.

CONCLUSION

By examining the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, the history of the region,
and both the social and political developments of Hezbollah, a clearer
legal picture can be formed with respect to the type of international
humanitarian law that will apply in a future conflict between the two
States. Due to Hezbollah's robust status in Lebanese economic, social,
cultural, and political life, it is quite likely that a future armed conflict
will be international in nature. If Hezbollah will again act either
implicitly or explicitly on Lebanon's behalf, all of the Geneva
Conventions will govern the conflict. Furthermore, Additional Protocols
I and II will bind Lebanon because they are a signing party to this
international treaty. Israel, as a non-signatory, will be bound by those
principles in both Additional Protocol I and II that rise to the level of
customary law.
As international humanitarian law develops with each new armed
conflict, it is also important to remember that Hezbollah militia may still
be defined as "combatants" in a future armed conflict. In such a
scenario, Additional Protocol I may provide prisoner of war protection to
members of Hezbollah, provided that certain codified requirements are
met by the group. Specifically, Hezbollah would have to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population and carry arms in plain view
during those times they are preparing for or engaging in military combat.
In this type of conflict, Common Article 3 and customary law will also
bind Hezbollah. Additionally, if Hezbollah limits its activity within
mainstream Lebanese society and politics, it would be classified as
terrorists, and be held accountable under Israeli domestic law.
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From a humanitarian perspective, the hope is that Hezbollah, Lebanon,
and Israel will not find themselves in a future armed conflict. However,
not only does history usually repeat itself, but the Middle East is also a
steaming pot of conflict that will likely keep boiling over. With this in
mind, how Hezbollah is classified in future conflicts will have a
tremendous impact on what laws will govern Hezbollah's conduct. If it
is held to answer and is accountable under all of the Geneva
Conventions, Additional Protocol I, and international customary law, the
chances that the group will act more responsibly will only increase.
Perhaps, Hezbollah will continue to grow and focus its attention on the
complete annihilation of Israel. Possibly, Israel will also continue to
violate various international humanitarian laws. However, the continued
hope is that the core laws applicable to armed conflicts will help restore
some peace in this part of the world.
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